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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
COMMONWEALTH NATIONAL BANK, a
national banking association,
Plaimtiff,

v.
KENNEDY COMPANY, an unincorporated
association, CHARLES R. KENNEDY, JR.,
BLACK CORPORATION, WHITE PARTNERSHIP, DOE ONE THROUGH DOE
TEN, inclusive,
Defendants.
THE KENNEDY COMPANY, a copartnership, CHARLES R. KENNEDY, REBECCA
KENNEDY, his wife,
Cross-Complainants & Appellants,

Case No.

12786

v.

COMMONWEALTH NATIONAL BANK, a
national banking association, and FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Cross-Defendants & Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on a promissory note by Commonwealth National Bank against appellants. Appellants
counterclaimed against Commonwealth, claiming that
Commonwealth wrongfully dishonored a check, wrongfully debited the Kennedy Company Enterprise account
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in the amount of $2,587.59, and for wrongful garnishment.
Fireman's Fund as surety for the garnishment bond was
joined as a party to the wrongful garnishment claim.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft, in the Third Judicial District Court in
the State of Utah on November 22, 1971. At the beginning
of the trial the parties stipulated to judgment against
appellants on the promissory note in the amount of $8,500
plus interest and to dismissal of their counterclaim for
wrongfully debiting appellants' account. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action on appellants' claim
for wrongful dishonor of check and awarded plaintiff '
$2,000 attorney's fees on the promissory note. The court
dismissed appellants' counterclaim for wrongful garnishment finding the issue had been previously adjudicated
by Judge Merrill C. Faux.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents ask that the verdict of the jury and
decision of the lower court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents believe that appellants' statement of the
facts is incomplete, unclear and argumentative and, therefore, submit their own statement of facts.
Defendant Charles Kennedy testified that on May 6,
1968, his wife drew a check in the amount of $5,000 pay-
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able to Mr. Robert McCluskey and mailed it to Mr. McCluskey in Hamilton, Montana (T-398). The check was
signed "Rebecca Kennedy" (Ex. D-3). The number
93-58/921 was stamped twice in the upper right-hand
corner of the check. Charles Kennedy admitted that this
number was stamped on the check by appellants (T-405).
The number 93-58/921 is the transit number of the First
National Bank located in Bozeman, Montana (T-405).
The transit number for Commonwealth National Bank is
1197/1210 (T-425). Each bank in the United States has
a different transit number and these transit numbers appear in the upper right-hand corner of checks and are a
method of identification of the drawee bank (T-421-425).
The check was not drawn on a standard bank check form
but rather on a special check form made up for the Kennedy Company for advertising purposes. The form contained the name "Kennedy Company" on the top and the
wording "New York, N. Y." to the left of the place where
the date is normally put on a check (Ex. D-4).
Appellants had two checking accounts at Commonwealth National Bank - a personal account of Charles
R. or Rebecca Z. Kennedy and an account in the name of
the "Kennedy Company Enterprises", which latter account had authorized signatures on the signature card of
"Charles Kennedy" and "R. Z. Kennedy" (Ex. P-12).
The coded account number on the check applied to the
latter account. The check was deposited by Mrs. McCluskey in her banking account at Citizen's State Bank
in Hamilton, Montana (T-677). It reached Common-
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wealth National Bank on May 23rd, 1968, and was returned unpaid the same day. Irene Rosa, cashier at Commonwealth National Bank testified the check was irregular for three reasons: (1) the check was signed "Rebecca
Kennedy" an unauthorized signature of the Kennedy
Company Enterprise account; (2) it contained an incorrect transit number; and (3) the check contained the
name "Kennedy Company" while the account was in the
name "Kennedy Company Enterprises" (T-429).
The evidence did not establish the exact route the
check followed after it first left the Commonwealth National Bank and before it reached the Citizens State
Ba....1k in Hamilton, Montana. However, at some point
along the route after it left Commonwealth a sticker entitled "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis" containing
"unable to determine where payable" was placed on it. The
evidence is also inconclusive as to the name of the bank
which, apparently confused by the check, typed the notation "not drawn on 11-97" on the check, or the date
when this was done.
Charles Kennedy testified the $5,000 was to reimburse the McCluskey's for their investment in silver bullion which Charles Kennedy had sold for them (T-507508). Charles Kennedy had been introduced to the McCluskeys, an elderly couple in their 70's, in February of
1968, through a mutual acquaintance (T-662-623) . The
McCluskeys' total assets consisted of their home in Hamilton, Montana, some property in California, about $40,000
worth of certificates of deposit in a Canadian Bank, some
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gold coins and $5,000 which they had invested in silver
bullion through the Foreign Commerce Bank in Zurich,
Switzerland. Charles Kennedy indicated to the McCluskeys that the investment might be a fraud and that
he become their investment adviser (T-663-664). Kennedy obtained from Mrs. McCluskey a special power of
attorney to handle the silver bullion investment and a
general power of attorney covering "all matters whatsoever" (Ex. P-37). Dan White, the president of Commonwealth National Bank was also given co-powers with
Charles Kennedy on the powers of attorney. Charles
Kennedy sold the silver bullion for the McCluskeys by
sending a cable to the Foreign Commerce Bank in Zurich
(T-565). A check in the amount of $7,587.59, representing
the return on the $5,000 investment made a little over a
month earlier by the McCluskeys plus their profit of
almost $2,587.59 was sent to Mr. McCluskey from the
Foreign Commerce Bank on March 22nd (Ex. P-38).
Pursuant to Charles Kennedy's instructions, Mrs. McCluskey sent the check to him. On May 6, 1968, Kennedy
sent the $5,000 check heretofore mentioned to Mrs. McCluskey, keeping the $2,587.59 profit for himself (T-675).
Mr. Kennedy also took control of the McCluskeys' gold
coins and certificates of deposit during this period of time.
He took the gold coins to Salt Lake City. Mr. Kennedy
testified he wanted to value the coins (T-531). He also
took the certificates of deposit which he planned to sell,
although Mrs. McCluskey testified she did not understand what was to be done with the funds (T-666).

Before the end of April, Mrs. McCluskey began
having second thoughts about the wisdom of having
turned her complete financial affairs over to Mr. Kennedy,
a total stranger. On April 22, 1968, she wrote to Mr.
Kennedy asking that the gold coins be returned to her
(Ex. P-40). On April 24, 1968, she again wrote asking
for the return of the coins and indicated he was going a
"little too fast" with her investments (Ex. P-41). On
May 25, 1968, Mrs. McCluskey wrote to Mrs. Kennedy
stating that they wanted time to "think these things out"
and asked Mr. Kennedy to return their certificates of
deposit and passbooks (Ex. D-28). On May 26, 1968, she
wrote Mrs. Kennedy cancelling the powers of attorney she
gave him and demanding he return them to her (Ex.
D-30) . In the May 26th letter she also questioned Kennedy mal<ing "almost $3,000 profit on the sale of the
bullion". Finally, on June 6, 1968, she wrote Mr. Kennedy
a nasty letter seeking return of the $2,587.59 for selling
the bullion stating "Mr. Kennedy, to be frank we are not
at all certain as to what services you have rendered" (Ex.
P-42).
Mrs. McCluskey first received notice that the
check had been returned by Commonwealth National
Bank on June 20, 1968, when the Citizens Bank in Hamilton, Montana notified her by mail that her account was
being charged $5,000 because the Citizens State Bank
could not locate the Kennedy Company account (T-678,
Ex. P-53).
The first mention of the returned check to Mr.
Kennedy is in a letter bearing the notation "received
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on September 3rd", notifying him that the $5,000 check
had not cleared and demanding a cashier's check to replace it. On September 5th she again wrote Mr. Kennedy
demanding a cashier's check on Kennedy's local bank
account in Salt Lake City. Instead of complying with
Mrs. McCluskey's request Kennedy boarded a plane to
San Francisco, obtained a certified check from Commonwealth National Bank and presented it to an attorney in
Hamilton, Montana for delivery to Mrs. McCluskey (T530).

On August 27, 1968 Commonwealth National Bank
loaned appellants $8,500 evidenced by a promissory
note payable on demand (Ex. P-1). On August 8, 1969,
Commonwealth filed a complaint in the Third District
Court against appellants to recover on the note. After
filing the complaint, Commonwealth National Bank, pursuant to Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
had a writ of garnishment issued attaching the appellants'
checking account at The Continental Bank and Trust
Company, Seventieth South Branch. A bond and affidavit alleging the cause for the writ were filed at the time
the writ was issued. The writ was served on August 11,
1969. On August 14, 1969, upon oral motion of appellants
and without notice, the garnishment was released by
Judge Stewart M. Hanson. On September 11, 1969, Commonwealth National Bank filed its motion for reinstatement of garnishment. Appellants filed a reply to the motion on October 15, 1969. Hearing on the motion was held
on October 22, 1969, before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux.
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Affidavits were filed by Commonwealth National Bank
in support of the motion and by appellants in opposition
to the motion. After hearing oral argument and receiving
the evidence the court ordered the garnishment reinstated,
finding that it had been improperly released and that the
evidence supported the grounds alleged in the affidavit
for garnishment. No money was ever replaced by appellants in the garnished account. Appellants in their answer to respondents' complaint, denied the promissory
note and filed a counterclaim for wrongful dishonor of a
check and a counterclaim for wrongful garnishment and a
counterclaim for a wrongful debit to their account in the
amount of $2,587.59.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE JURY'S VERDICT SHOULD NOT BE
DISTURBED WITHOUT A SHOWING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Appellants assign numerous errors to the trial court,
most of them arising over the issue of the alleged wrongful
dishonor of the $5,000 check payable to Mr. McCloskey.
The jury in this case sat through five full days of trial
and after deliberation came to the conclusion on the basis
of all the evidence that the claim for wrongful dishonor
of the check was without merit. Appellants object to the
exclusion of certain evidence by the trial court, primarily
the testimony of two witnesses. A review of the record

9

will show the trial court conscientiously deliberated over
each of the evidentiary rulings. For appellants to prevail
upon appeal they must show not only that these closely
considered rulings of the trial court were in error but
also that such errors were of such magnitude that "there
is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would
have been reached" but for the errors. Brunson v. Strong,
17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P. 2d 451 (1966); Paull v. Zions First
Nat'l Bank, 18 Utah 2d 182, 417 P. 2d 759 (1966).
POINT IL
OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF DEPONENT, DANIEL WHITE, WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT
WHERE NO FOUNDATION WAS LAID AS
TO THE QUALIFICATION OF THE WITNESS.
Defendants introduced at trial the deposition of Daniel White. White, a close friend and business associate
of Charles Kennedy had been president of Commonwealth
National Bank from 1964 to 1968 (T-620). The court
refused to admit into evidence two answers which Mr.
White gave in his deposition to the following questions,
to which appellants object:
Q. Do you know any reason why this check
would have been returned by Commonwealth National Bank?
A. No. We sent it back as we apparently did.
It was an internal mistake (T-628).
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Q. Now I will show you in red some tyne.
written ink with a little phrase typed on the
of the check as follows: "ITEM NOT DRAWN
ON 11-97". Do you know how that got on the
check?

A. I couldn't say how it got on there. It is
typed on there obviously. I just wouldn't know.
Q.

eous?

Your opinion would be that it was erron.

A. Yes (T-629).
Counsel for respondents objected to the admissibility
of these answers on the grounds that no foundation was
laid as to the qualification of the witness and that they
called for conclusions of the witness. The objections were
sustained.
The possession of the required qualifications by a
particular person offered as a witness must be expressly
shown by the party offering such witness. 'Ibis follows
from the nature of the situation and is universally conceded. See Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed. §560, p. 640.
Appellants contend that the fact that Mr. White was
president of the bank qualified him to testify to the questions to which the objections were sustained. Respondent
would submit that this contention is erroneous and that
the title of bank president does not give a person holding
such position a carte blanche qualification to testify as
to each and every area of banking without showing that
he is familiar with the particular area about which he is
asked to give his opinion. Surely no one would contend
that the title, President of General Motors, would give

11
such a person the right without further qualification to
testify as to the mechanical structure of a Chevrolet automobile. A modern bank is in much the same position as
any giant corporation, having many many different areas
and divisions requiring particular knowledge about which
all of
expert. Absolutely no questions
were asked by counsel for appellants as to Mr. White's
qualification to answer the questions with regard to checking procedure of the bank. The only reference in the
record concerning Mr. White's qualifications to give his
opinion on this check is his admission during cross-examination that he was not familiar with the details of check
processing which Commonwealth submits shows the validity of its argument:
Q. Now did Commonwealth Bank wire when
there was a nonpayment of a check where a check
was dishonored? Did it send a wire directly?

did.

A.

I don't know. I don't know what they

Q. You mentioned earlier that it was a standard practice for a bank to wire the fact that this
check ...

A. Look, I was president of the bank and I
didn't get into every detail. Now, the cashier can
give you an answer to the question if you want to
subpoena him. It would be a lot better than mine
(T-650-651).
In addition to the fact no foundation was laid as to
Mr. White's knowledge in this area of banking, Mr. White
testified he had no personal contact with the check (T-
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651). He did not identify or state he was familiar with
the signature card or the authorized signature for the
Kennedy Company Enterprises account. He did not
identify or review any photographs of the check showing
its condition as it came into and left the bank. In summary, he had absolutely no foundation for the conclusions
which the court struck from the record.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY OF BERNARD
TANNER.
Appellants introduced into evidence the deposition
of Mrs. Nellie McCluskey which had been taken in Hamilton, Montana, and then attempted to impeach the credibility of her testimony by introducing testimony of Bernard Tanner. As part of appellants' offer of proof for
admission of Tanner's testimony, the court received the
testimony outside of the presence of the jury. Tanner
would have testified that on May 25, 1968, Mrs. Mc·
Cluskey told him that "the check hadn't cleared" (T·
793).
The inequity of allowing Mr. Tanner to testify is
readily apparent. Mrs. McCluskey was 1,000 miles away
and could not be given the opportunity to explain or deny
Mr. Tanner's testimony. This inequity is the reason why
Rule 22 of the Rules of Evidence as adopted by Supreme
Court of Utah gives the trial court the discretion to exclude such testimony. Rule 22 as pertinent states:
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"As affecting the credibility of a witness . . . (b)
extensive evidence of prior contr2.dictory statements whether oral or written may in the discretion of the judge be excluded unless the witness
was so examined while testifying as to give him
an opportunity to identify, explain or deny the
statement."
Counsel for appellants did not bring up the subject
of Mr. Tanner's testimony during the deposition of Mrs.
McClusl:ey to give her an opportunity to deny or explain
the statements attributed to her. In addition, during Mr.
Kennedy's dsposition counsel for Commonwealth National
Banl: cis:-::ed 1'1r. Kennedy:
Q. What other witnesses do you plan to call
to trial other than Dan White?
A. Mr. Bernard Tanner.
Q.

What will be the nature of his testimony?

A. I don't know at this time. I haven't discussed it with him.
This gave appellants an additional opportunity to disclose
Tanner's testimony in order that Mrs. McCluskey could
be questioned further either by written interrogatory or
another oral deposition. Instead, appellants chose to introduce the testimony at trial where no opportunity was
possible to have Mrs. McCluskey explain the allegation.
Plaintiff would submit that under such facts it was clearly
within the discretion of the trial judge to exclude such
testimony.
This result IS not in conflict with Rule 26 (f) as
appellants suggest. The advisory committee's final draft
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of the last sentence of Rule 26 (f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure from which Rule 26 (f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted contains the following clause:
"[a]nd, without having first called them to the
deponent's attention, may show statements contradictory thereto made at any time by the deponent."
In concluding that the Supreme Court eliminated the
right to impeach testimony of a deponent by the introduction of contradictory statements where the deponent
was not examined about such statements during the deposition by the elimination of the above clause, Professor
Moore makes the following statement:
"What then was the effect of the Supreme Court's
action in striking this provision out of Rule 32 (c).
It is believed the effect is this: Contradictory
statements known at the time of the deposition
hearing, or which reasonably could have been
known, may not be used subsequently to impeach
the deponent's deposition; the deponent should
have been impeached at the deposition hearing by
calling contradictory statements to his attention,
and giving him the opportunity to explain." Vol.
4 (a), Moores Federal Procedure
This reasoning is consistent with Rule 22 with the excep·
tion that it doesn't even give the trial judge the discretion
to admit the contradictory statements.
An additional reason for excluding the testimony of
Mr. Tanner is that the testimony does not contradict Mrs.
McCluskey's statements. The fact that the check "has '
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not cleared" on l\1ay 25th does not contradict the fact
that the first time she heard the check was retun1ed was
June 20th because the fact the check had not cleared
would only m2an that Mrs. McCluskey's provisional credit
at the Citizen's Bank had not become final. It would not
mean that she had been notified that the check had been
returned.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISr-HSSED THE WRONGFUL GARNISH MENT CLAIM.
Appellants' position that Rule 64(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure violates Utah Constitution, the
United States Constitution, and Rule 65 (a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore, appellants are
entitled to damages for wrongful garnishment is clearly
without merit. Snwdack v. Family Finance Corporati.on
of Bayview, 395 U. S. 337 (1969), cited by appellants,
is the only case decided by the United States Supreme
Court concerning the constitutionality of prejudgment
garnishment involved a Wisconsin statute. Because the
Wisconsin garnishment statute was narrowly drawn (it
did not require cause for garnishment or means for release
prior to judgment) and because the case involved the
garnishment of wages which the court found to be an
area needing special protection, the statute was struck
down as violating procedural due process. However, the
court made it clear that such summary procedure may
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meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary
situations. Rule 64 ( d) requires a bond, an affidavit showing cause, and provides a means for release by defendant.
In addition wages were not garnished. In summary, none
of the due process problems the United States Supreme
Court found objectionable in Sniadack are found in Utah
Rule 64 (d) or in this case, and respondent submits that
Rule 64 (d), especially in non-wage cases, is within "extraordinary situations" justifying summary procedure
which the United States Supreme Court found proper
in Sniadack.
In any event assuming that the Utah statute was
unconstitutional respondent would submit that this fact
would only entitle defendant to a release of garnishment
and not to damages for wrongful garnishment. Wrongful
garnishment requires the showing that the grounds
alleged for the garnishment do not exist. Cahoon v.
Hoggan, 31 Utah 74, 86 P. 763, 764; 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment 601. The fact a garnishment statute was declared unconstitutional would not make the garnishment
wrongful. None of the cases cited by appellants involved
a claim of wrongful garnishment. These cases either involved an attempt by the party whose funds were garn·
ished to have the garnishment released or had nothing
to do with garnishment.
The only party that stands to lose from the garnish·
ment proceedings is Commonwealth National Bank and
not appellants. Commonwealth has lost its security for
enforcement of its judgment by the garnishment having
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been released through an ex-parte proceeding without
notice to Commonwealth. Under such circumstances if
anybody should be heard to complain it should be Commonwealth and not appellants.

POINT V.
TESTIMONY OF M E N TA L SUFFERING
AND ANXIETY WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
West's Annotated California Code, Commercial, Section 4402, which governs damages for wrongful dishonor
of a check states:
"A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages
proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor of
an item. ·when a dishonor occurs through a mistake, liability is limited to actual damages proved."
Section 4-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code, from
which the above section was adopted, was included by the
framers to restrict the common law which had allowed
"per se" damages to a merchant or trader without any
proof of actual damage. S'ee Uniform Commercial Code,
Comment 3. Even under the more liberal common law
emotional distress did not constitute a recoverable item
of damage for wrongful dishonor of a check. Michie,
Banks and Banking, 5 (a), §244. To accept defendants'
argument that damages for mental distress and anxiety
are now recoverable under the Uniform Act one must
determine that the framers restricted the recovery of
damages to actual damages but at the same time opened
the back door to allow the recovery of the nebulous item

-¥- qo7_,
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of mental suffering and anxiety. There is no evidence to
support such a claim. Appellants claim that section 4402
sounds in tort is untrue as Comment 2 of the Uniform Act
discloses:
"2. The liability of a drawer for dishonor has
sometimes been stated as one for breach of contract, sometimes as one for negligence or other
breach of tort duty and sometimes as defamation.
This section does not attempt to specify a theory."
U. C. C. 4-402, Comment 2 (1962 Text).
Respondents would submit that it is clear from the
Comments to the Uniform Act that the framers did not
intend to expand the common law but rather to restrict
it, and certainly did not intend to allow recovery for mental suffering and anxiety where such damages were not
recoverable under common law.
An additional reason existed for excluding evidence
of mental suffering and anxiety in this case. The mental
suffering claimed was by a partner (Charles Kennedy)
while the wrongful dishonor was of a check of the Ken- ,
nedy Company, a partnership (T-597). In the case of
Louchs v. Albuquerque Natiorwl Bank, 76 N. M. 735, 418
P. 2d 191 (1966), a case very similar to the one herein, the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that partners were not
entitled to recover for injuries or illnesses claimed because
of wrongful dishonor of a partnership check. In rejecting
the claim of a partner to recover for damages of an ulcer
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which he claimed was caused for dishonor of a partnership
check, the court stated:
"No duty was owed to him personally by reason
of the debtor-creditor relationship between the
bank and the partnership." Pg. 197.
The court after reviewing several different legal situations in which a partnership is a legal entity, including
the fact that it is recognized as one under the Uniform
Commercial Code (U. C. C. 1-201) the court met the contention that a partnership is not considered a legal entity
in all situations:
"We also appreciate that a partnership is not considei0E.d a distinct legal entity to the extent that a
natural person or corporation is so regarded in the
law, but here we are dealing only with the question of separateness as a customer or depositor of
the bank, and its rights to any damages flowing
from wrongful dishonor of its checks drawn on its
account. The relationship between a bank and its
depositor is a contractual relatio11ship of a debtor
and a creditor ... As shown above, a partnership
can enter into a contractual relationship of debtor
and creditor, as a customer of the bank, in accordance with the express provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
'While a partnership at common law was not considered a distinct entity from the partners comprising it, the modern tendency is the other way,
i.e., to treat a partnership as an entity distinct
from and independent of the individuals composing it. 20 R. C. L., i-f80456 and cases under Note
16;' Gleason v. Sing, 297 N. W. at 722."

20
The main theme of the Loucks opinion is that for pur.
poses of banking accounts, partnerships are separate legal
entities and, therefore, each partner shouldn't be able to
recover for alleged partnership injury. Respondents submit this is sound reasoning and urges this court to follow
Loucks.
POINT VI.
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE CARD AGREEMENT.
Jury Instruction 10 concerned the question of signatures on the signature card. The issue before the court
was not whether Charles Kennedy's wife was an authorized signature on the account as appellants contend, but
rather whether the signature "Rebecca Kennedy" was an
authorized signature when the signature card was signed
"R. Z. Kennedy". There was no evidence in the record
that there was any agreement between the bank and the
appellants to honor checks signed differently from the
signature on the signature card. The evidence in this
record is to the contrary. Dan White, president of the
ban!;;:, and appellants' witness testified:
Q. Mr. White, did you ever have any conver·
sation with Mr. Kennedy that the bank was to pay
check No. 8000, drawn by his wife, in this fashion
with her full first name?
A. I never had any conversation with Mr.
Kennedy that I can remember where I agreed to
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specifically pay the check identified by
and amount.
The record contains no other reference to the honoring of checks in forms of signature other than on the signature account and therefore respondents would submit
Instruction 10 correctly states the law applicable to the
case.
CONCLUSION
This is the 21st court appearance that this case has
required. Many of the appearances were required by respondents to obtain discovery in compliance with lower
court orders which appellants had refused to obey. Certainly this has proved a burden on the courts and caused
a span of three years from the filing of the complaint to
the date of trial. Finally, when the trial date arrived and
the facts were presented to the jury, the jury returned a
verdict of no cause of action on appellants' counterclaim
fer wrongful dishonor of the check. Respondents submit
that the evidence was so overwhelmingly in favor of the
bank that the jury could not reasonably have returned any
other verdict. The evidence was clear and uncontradicted
that the check should have been returned because it had
an incorrect signature, an incorrect account name and
an incorrect transit number. The evidence was also clear
from Mrs . .l\fcCluskey's testimony and from letters introduced into evidence that she terminated her account with
Kennedy before she knew about the retun1ed check and
therefore Kennedy suffered no damages in any event.
There was no evidence introduced to the contrary. Re-
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spondents submit that the evidence and matters raised by
appellants on appeal were correctly decided by the trial
court, but even if an error was committed on any of the
matters it would not justify a reversal in light of the overwhelming evidence in support of the verdict. Respondents
further submit that appellants' constitutional attack on
Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governing
garnishment is clearly without merit and irrelevant to the
claim of wrongful garnishment.
For the above reasons, respondent asks that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Albert J. Colton
Kent S. Lewis
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